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Introduction
During 1923, the South African government began to issue free vaccine for the immu-
nization of cattle against anthrax. Five years later, it introduced compulsory annual vac-
cination in parts of the Transkeian Territories, an area reserved for occupation by Africans.
Thereafter, the state sought to extend both compulsory and discretionary vaccination. In
1942, scientists at the government’s Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute announced that
theyhadissued6milliondosesofvaccineduringthepreviousyear.Approximatelyhalfthe
cattle in the country were being immunized annually with a special product which scien-
tists at the Institute had recently devised.
1 The scale of vaccination was unprecedented
within the country and the annual issue of anthrax vaccine far surpassed the amount
supplied for any other animal disease. It was a major state intervention in rural society.
Nevertheless, vaccination against anthrax in South Africa is absent from the historiogra-
phy, while published contemporary accounts are few.
2
The history of anthrax control in South Africa, which concerns public policy and
technical innovation, relates to the wider historiography of medicine, science and tech-
nology in the British Empire. If Daniel Headrick has interpreted various innovations in
science and medicine as ‘‘tools of empire’’, which enabled colonists to conquer indigenous
populations and overcome hostile environmental conditions,
3 historians have more
recently been concerned with the ways in which western medicine assisted colonial
administrations in extending social control over the colonized.
4 Medical science under-
pinned militaristic public health policies and sanitary measures, in which vaccination,
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1M Sterne, J Nicol and M C Lambrechts, ‘The
effects of large-scale active immunization against
anthrax’, Journal of the South African Veterinary
Medical Association (JSAVMA), 1942, 13: 53–63,
pp. 53–4.
2J Nicol, ‘Anthrax control in native reserves’,
JSAVMA, 1933, 4: 46–7.
3D R Headrick, The tools of empire: technology
and European imperialism in the nineteenth century,
Oxford University Press, 1981; idem, The tentacles of
progress: technology transfer in the age of
imperialism, 1850–1940, Oxford University Press,
1988.
4Important texts are D Arnold (ed.), Imperial
medicine and indigenous societies, Manchester
University Press, 1988; R MacLeod and M Lewis
(eds), Disease, medicine and empire: perspectives on
western medicine and the experience of European
expansion, London and New York, Routledge, 1988;
M Vaughan, Curing their ills: colonial power and
African illness, Stanford University Press, 1991; D
Arnold, Colonising the body: state medicine and
epidemic disease in nineteenth-century India,
Berkeley and London, University of California Press,
1993; M Harrison, Public health in British India:
Anglo-Indian preventive medicine, 1859–1914,
Cambridge University Press, 1994; A Cunningham
and B Andrews (eds), Western medicine as contested
knowledge, Manchester University Press, 1997.
465particularly against smallpox, at times played a significant part.
5 In Africa, such
interventions sometimes disrupted long-established methods of disease control based
on environmental regulation, with disastrous results for the health of the colonized.
6
In South Africa too, historians have been concerned with the relation of racially biased
medicalinstitutions,publicpoliciesandprivatepracticetotheimpositionanddevelopment
of segregation and apartheid.
7 In this regard, however, Harriet Deacon has suggested a
contradiction between the analysis of western medicine as a means by which the state
extended control over Africans and the argument that Africans have suffered because they
have been excluded from the benefits to health that it has potentially offered.
8
A similar contradiction is evident in the rather scant historiography of state
veterinary services and science in South Africa (and elsewhere in the continent).
9
While more detailed accounts of veterinary scientists and their activities have
begun to emerge,
10 veterinary science has been interpreted generally as a means of
enabling white ‘‘settler’’ stock farmers to overcome problems of production posed
by disease and environment, or even as an indirect subsidy to enable them to over-
come competition from African producers.
11 Historians have also focused on political
conflict associated with state interventions aimed at controlling rinderpest and East
Coast fever among African-owned cattle, arguing that these epizootics were
occasions on which the state sought to extend political and social control over
5D Arnold, ‘Smallpox and colonial medicine in
nineteenth-century India’, in Arnold (ed.), Imperial
medicine, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 45–65.
6In this regard, trypanosomosis has been a major
focus. See, for example, J Ford, The role of
trypanosomiases in African ecology: a study of the
tsetse fly problem, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971; H
Kjekshus,Ecologycontrolandeconomicdevelopment
inEastAfricanhistory:thecaseofTanganyika,1850–
1950, London, Heinemann Educational, 1977; M
Lyons, The colonial disease: a social history of
sleeping sickness in northern Zaire, 1900–1940,
Cambridge University Press, 1992; K Arden Hoppe,
Lords of the fly: sleeping sickness control in British
EastAfrica,1900–1960,Westport,CT,Praeger,2003.
7See, for example, S Marks, Divided sisterhood:
class, race, and gender in the nursing profession in
South Africa, London, Macmillan, 1994; S Marks and
N Andersson, ‘Issues in the political economy of
health in Southern Africa,’ J. Southern Afr. Stud.,
1987, 13 (2): 177–86; R Packard, White plague, black
labour: tuberculosis and the political economy of
health and disease in South Africa, Pietermaritzburg,
University of Natal Press and James Currey, 1989; M
Swanson, ‘‘‘The sanitation syndrome’’: bubonic
plague and urban native policy in the Cape Colony,
1900–1909’,J.Afr.Hist.,1977,18(3):pp.387–410;M
Swanson, ‘The Asiatic menace: creating segregation
in Durban 1870–1910’, International Journal of
African Historical Studies, 1983, 16 (3): 401–21; E B
van Heyningen, ‘Agents of empire: the medical
profession in the Cape Colony, 1880–1910’, Med.
Hist., 1989, 33: 450–71.
8HDeacon,‘RacismandmedicalscienceinSouth
Africa’s Cape Colony in the mid- to late nineteenth
century,’ Osiris, 2000, 15: 190–206, p. 191.
9CriticalaccountsofveterinarymedicineinAfrica
are few. See, however,J L Giblin,‘East Coast fever in
socio-historical context: a case study from Tanzania’,
International Journal of African Historical Studies,
1990, 23 (3): 401–21; R Waller and K Homewood,
‘Elders and experts: contesting veterinary knowledge
in a pastoral community’, in Cunningham and
Andrews (eds), op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 69–93.
10WBeinart,‘Vets,virusesandenvironmentalism
attheCape’,Paideuma,1997,43:227–52;DGilfoyle,
‘Veterinary science and public policy at the Cape, c.
1877–1910’, DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford,
2002.
11JKrikler,Revolutionfromabove,rebellionfrom
below: the agrarian Transvaal at the turn of the
century, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 77, 80–3;
S Milton, ‘To make the crooked straight: settler
colonialism, imperial decline and the South African
beef industry, 1902–1942’, PhD thesis, University of
London, 1996, pp. 34–6. Milton also identifies a brief
period during the mid-1940s when the state adopted a
more positive attitude towards cattle production by
Africans. S Milton, ‘The Transvaal beef frontier:
environment, markets and the ideology of
development, 1902–1942’, in T Griffiths and L Robin
(eds), Ecology and empire: environmental history of
settler societies, Edinburgh, Keele University Press,
1997, pp. 199–212, on pp. 208–9.
466
Daniel GilfoyleAfricans.
12 The extension of veterinary services to African-owned stock through vaccina-
tion against anthrax is, however, incongruent with these interpretations of state policy.
WhileitmaybearguedthatstateattemptstocontrolanthraxinAfricanareaswereintended
to benefit white stock farming by tackling possible sources of infection, the idea that state
veterinary services operated simply for its benefit needs to be qualified. The motivation for
the extension of state veterinary services to African areas, and the way it functioned in
practice, requires further analysis. I argue that mass vaccination in African areas, made
possible by the operation of bureaucratic regulatory systems and asymmetrical power
relationsinaraciallysegregated society,wasanimportantmeansbywhichstate-employed
veterinary scientists acquired knowledge about the disease and evaluated innovations in
vaccine technology.
During the 1920s, officials in the Department of Agriculture became increasingly con-
cerned about the threat of restrictions upon pastoral exports from South Africa because of
their contamination with anthrax. In response, government vets promoted and later
enforced vaccination against the disease, but for various reasons the practice was unsatis-
factory as a method of prevention and control. This led to a period of experiment during
which South African veterinary scientists sought to develop improved vaccines through
technological innovation. The compulsory vaccination of African-owned cattle provided a
means of obtaining a statistical basis for the evaluation of these new methods and pro-
ducts.
13 Laboratory investigations and field vaccination, with associated state-enforced
regulations, were thus components of an experimental system in which the results obtained
by vets in the field informed both technological adjustment and social policy.
14 Vaccina-
tion against anthrax in African-occupied areas such as the Transkei, carried out under the
control of state officials, was a means of testing a technology which was eventually used
throughout South Africa and more widely around the world. I examine experimental
method in the investigation of anthrax and the development of the vaccine in some detail.
This article is therefore intended to contribute to the historiography of scientific practice in
bacteriology and immunology during the 1920s and 1930s.
15
12W Beinart, ‘The anatomy of a rural scare: East
Griqualand in the 1890s’, in W Beinart and C Bundy,
Hidden struggles in rural South Africa: politics and
popular movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape
1890–1930, London, James Currey; Johannesburg,
Ravan Press, 1987, pp. 46–77; C Bundy, ‘‘‘We don’t
want your rain, we won’t dip’’: popular opposition,
collaboration and social control in the anti-dipping
movement, 1908–1916’, in ibid., pp. 191–221; P
Phoofolo, ‘Epidemics and revolutions: the rinderpest
epidemic in late nineteenth-century South Africa’,
Past and Present, 1993, 138: 112–43; C van Onselen,
‘Reactions to rinderpest in southern Africa, 1896–
1897’, J. Afr. Hist., 1972, 13: 473–88.
13On the increasing importance of statistical
methodsforclinicaltrialsduringthetwentiethcentury,
see J R Matthews, Quantification and the quest for
medical certainty, Princeton University Press, 1995.
Foramoregeneraloverviewoftheroleofquantitative
methods in dealing with uncertainty in problems of
government, see I Hacking, ‘How should we do the
history of statistics’, in G Burchell, C Gordon, and P
Miller (eds), The Foucault effect: studies in
governmentalitywithtwolecturesbyandaninterview
withMichelFoucault,London,HarvesterWheatsheaf,
1991, pp. 181–96.
14A M Silverstein, ‘The heuristic value of experi-
mental systems’, J. Hist. Biol., 1994, 27: 437–47.
15While much has been written on bacteriology,
‘‘germ theory’’ and the ‘‘laboratory revolution’’ in
medical science between 1870 and 1910, coverage for
the later period is much thinner. Some important texts
fortheearlierperiodareTDBrock,RobertKoch:alife
in medicine and bacteriology, Madison, Science Tech
Publishers, 1988; A Cunningham and P Williams
(eds), The laboratory revolution in medicine,
Cambridge University Press, 1992; G L Geison, The
privatescienceof LouisPasteur,PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1995; M Worboys, Spreading germs: disease
theories and medical practice in Britain, 1865–1900,
Cambridge University Press, 2000. The major works
on the history of immunology in the twentieth century
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945The first part provides context by describing the establishment and growth of state
veterinaryinstitutions and services as a responseto problems of disease.In the secondpart,
I describe how officials became increasingly concerned with the prevention and control of
anthrax during the early 1920s, particularly in the context of international attempts to
protect workers in the textile industry from the danger of contaminated wool and hair. In
the third part, I examine veterinary ideas about the nature of anthrax in South Africa and
attempts at control up to the 1930s, showing how the compulsory mass vaccination of
African-owned cattle became an important component of state policy. Government veter-
inary scientists, however, emphasized various perceived peculiarities of anthrax in the
region and argued that these limited the value of imported technological systems during a
period when the practice of vaccination greatly expanded. The final section analyses
laboratory experiments and technical innovations, the use of statistical studies obtained
through compulsory mass vaccination and the further extension of the practice.
The Animal Economy and Veterinary Institutions
Domestic animals provided an important source of food and traction for the indigenous
peoples ofsouthern AfricaandtheearlyDutch colonistsattheCape.Fromthe1820s,when
the British government actively encouraged immigration to the Cape of Good Hope,
pastoral production became increasingly commercialized. The new colonists imported
wool-producing merino sheep, which thrived in the semi-arid Karoo and in parts of the
Eastern Cape. As production increased rapidly through the mid-nineteenth century, wool
became the Cape’s major export, its sale on the British markets drawing the colony into the
international economy. Later, wool exports were substantially supplemented by the pro-
duction of mohair from angora goats, another settler import. While the expansion of
diamond mining from the 1870s, and gold mining from the 1890s, transformed southern
African societies, the exploitation of minerals did not displace pastoralism as a pillar of
South Africa’s economy until after the mid-twentieth century.
16 Furthermore, the urba-
nization which followed the large-scale exploitation of minerals created markets for meat
and dairy products, further stimulating the growth of commercial pastoralism. During the
late nineteenth century, parts of the Eastern Cape became important centres for cattle
farming and dairying, while colonial pastoralists sought to develop ranch-style beef pro-
duction onthegrasslandsofthe Northern Capeand,fromtheearlytwentiethcentury,inthe
adjoining parts of the Western Transvaal.
17 White commercial pastoral farming was there-
fore a major concern of the South African government throughout the period under review.
are theoretically oriented and concern debates and
controversies between scientists in leading
institutions. See P M H Mazumdar, Species and
specificity: an interpretation of the history of
immunology, Cambridge University Press, 1995; A M
Silverstein, A history of immunology, San Diego,
Academic Press, 1989. Some recent contributions to
the history of experimental practice in immunology
areWAnderson,‘Immunitiesofempire:race,disease,
andthenewtropicalmedicine,1900–1920’,Bull.Hist.
Med., 1996, 70: 94–118; P M H Mazumdar, ‘‘‘In the
silence of the laboratory’’: the League of Nations
standardizes syphilis tests’, Soc. Hist. Med., 2003, 16:
437–59;andKWaddington,‘Tostampout‘‘soterrible
a malady’’: bovine tuberculosis and tuberculin testing
in Britain, 1890–1939’, Med. Hist., 2004, 48: 29–48.
16W Beinart, The rise of conservation in South
Africa: settlers, livestock and the environment
1770–1950,OxfordUniversityPress,2003,especially
pp. 9–17.
17K Shillington, ‘Irrigation, agriculture and the
state: the Harts Valley in historical perspective’, in
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problems. From the 1870s, colonist farmers, particularly in the wetter, eastern parts of the
Cape and in Natal, became increasingly convinced that stock diseases presented serious
obstacles to the expansion of animal numbers. The population of sheep and angora goats in
some of the Eastern Cape districts began to decline very rapidly during the 1870s and the
concernsoffarmersresultedintheappointmentofthefirstgovernmentveterinarysurgeonin
theCapeduring1876,followingasimilarappointmentinNatal.Farmerswhogaveevidence
to the Cape’s Stock Diseases Commission of 1877 described how mysterious diseases had
destroyed many flocks. The early government vets sought to investigate these diseases,
but the small number of appointments, together with a heavy administrative burden, meant
that they made little progress in this direction until the end of the nineteenth century.
18
The African rinderpest epidemic, which reached southern Africa in 1896 and threatened
to devastate cattle holdings, was a major impetus to the expansion of veterinary services.
Thereafter, additional professional appointments at the Cape enabled state-employed
veterinary scientists to engage in more systematic research.
19 Following British victory
over the Afrikaner republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State in the South African
War (1899–1901), Lord Alfred Milner supervised the reconstruction of the defeated states,
with the objective of a unified South Africa.
20 Milner, a prime exponent of constructive
imperialism, was committed to harnessing science to the development of ‘‘settler’’ com-
mercial agriculture, a policy which was accompanied by the exclusion of African peasant
producers.HesetupamodernizingDepartmentofAgriculture,includingtheSwiss-trained
veterinary scientist Arnold Theiler to undertake research.
21 A British vet, Stewart Stock-
man, was appointed to lead a veterinary department consisting largely of British-trained
practitioners, the major function of which was the control of infectious and contagious
diseases in the field.
22
In1902,thehighlyvirulenttick-bornediseaseofcattle,EastCoastfever,brokeoutinthe
Transvaal. Over the next ten years, it spread throughout the Transvaal lowveld, Natal, the
Transkei and into the Eastern Cape, where the environmental conditions supported the tick
vector. East Coast fever, which produced morbidity and mortality rates above 90 per cent,
threatened to destroy the cattle industry of South Africa and made state veterinary services
indispensable. Itprovokedavigorous,ifsometimespoliticallycontroversial response from
the Transvaal’s new veterinary department, which was based on an extensive regulatory
system consisting of the dipping of cattle against ticks, movement embargoes, quarantines
and sometimes the destruction of the infected herd. East Coast fever remained a major
W Beinart, P Delius, and S Trapido (eds), Putting
a plough to the ground: accumulation and
dispossession in rural South Africa, 1850–1930,
Johannesburg,RavanPress,1986,pp.311–35;Milton,
‘Tomakethecrookedstraight’,op.cit.,note11above,
p. 119.
18Beinart,op.cit.,note10above;Gilfoyle,op.cit.,
note 10 above.
19D Gilfoyle, ‘Veterinary research and the
African rinderpest epizootic: the Cape Colony,
1896–1898’, J. Southern Afr. Stud., 2003,
29 (1): 133–54.
20S Marks and S Trapido, ‘Lord Milner and the
South African state’, History Workshop, 1979, 8:
51–80.
21Arnold Theiler was born in Frick, Switzerland
andstudiedtobeaveterinarianatBernandZurich.He
emigrated to the South African Republic in 1893, but
failed to obtain state employment as a vet until the
rinderpest epizootic of 1896. For a biography, see
T Gutsche, There was a man, Cape Town, Howard
Timmins, 1976.
22Krikler, op. cit., note 11 above, pp. 80–3.
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945preoccupation of the veterinary department until it was finally eradicated from South
Africa during the 1950s.
23
Throughout the 1900s, Arnold Theiler conducted research into various aspects of East
Coastfever,whichprovidedtheknowledgebaseforcontrolmeasures.Hewasrewarded, in
1908, with modern laboratory facilities at Onderstepoort, about ten miles north of Pretoria.
Following the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Onderstepoort
Veterinary Bacteriological Laboratories, later the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute,
became the centre for veterinary research throughout South Africa. Theiler oversaw
the inauguration of a veterinary faculty as part of the University of Pretoria in 1920,
which awarded degrees and doctorates in veterinary medicine. Thus began a period during
which the veterinary profession was increasingly ‘‘South Africanized’’ and the pursuit of
researchbecamelessdependentonimportedexpertise.Bythe1930s,veterinaryappointees
weretypicallywhite,maleSouthAfricans,frequentlythesonsoffarmers.Theilerretiredin
1927 and a new director, Petrus Johann du Toit, an Afrikaner, was appointed as his
replacement. Du Toit’s appointment was accompanied by a significant bureaucratic reor-
ganization, as the veterinary field services were now formally brought under Onderste-
poort’scontrol.DuToitthustookchargeoftheoverallformulationofveterinarypolicyand
field activities, as well as research.
24
As East Coast fever was gradually controlled during the 1910s, the research agenda at
Onderstepoort diversified. Given the increasingly segregationist nature of South African
society, the overall direction of research was determined largely by the concerns of white
farmers. A series of groundbreaking studies in plant toxicology, botulism in animals and
nutrition,which were ofwider relevancetopastoralismthroughoutthe world than theearly
work on ‘‘tropical animal diseases’’, such as East Coast fever, brought the Institute to
internationalprominenceduringthe1920s.Immunologicalstudies,manyofwhichadapted
technological innovations made in metropolitan countries, were an important component
of research during the 1930s. Veterinary scientists working at Onderstepoort released
vaccines against the insect-borne viral diseases African horsesickness and bluetongue
(sheep) and against anthrax. These vaccines and associated technologies were exported
to other parts of the British Empire and beyond, further bolstering the reputation of the
23P F Cranefield, Science and empire: East Coast
fever in Rhodesia and the Transvaal, Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
24K Brown, ‘Tropical medicine and animal
diseases: Onderstepoort and the development of
veterinary science in South Africa, 1908–1950’,
J. Southern Afr. Stud., 2005, 31 (3): 413–29.
Petrus J du Toit (1888–1967) was born at Somerset
Strand in the Western Cape. He studied zoology at
VictoriaCollege(latertheUniversityofStellenbosch)
andsubsequentlyinGermanyandSwitzerland.Hewas
awarded the degrees of DPhil in zoology at the
UniversityofZurichin1912andDoctorofVeterinary
Medicine at the University of Berlin in 1916. Despite
holding a British passport, he worked during the First
World War at the Veterinary Hochschule, publishing
a major textbook on tropical diseases of domestic
animals in collaboration with Professor Paul Knuth in
1921. He returned to South Africa to take up a post at
Onderstepoort in 1919 and succeeded Arnold Theiler
as Director in 1928, a post which he held until his
retirement in 1948. While directing research at
Onderstepoort, teaching at the Veterinary Faculty of
the University of Pretoria and participating in
international science organizations, du Toit published
many important contributions in the fields of
tropical animal diseases, immunology and nutrition.
D G Kingwill and B J F Schonland, ‘Petrus
Johann du Toit 1888–1967,’ Biographical
Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society,
1969, vol. 15, pp. 247–66.
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Daniel GilfoyleInstitute abroad and enabling it to take an increasingly prominent part in the ‘‘polycentric
communications network’’ of international veterinary science.
25
Anthrax and the Origins of an Economic Problem
The origins of anthrax in South Africa are obscure, but by at least the mid-nineteenth
century the disease was familiar to Anglophone farmers and Dutch pastoralists, who called
it ‘‘miltziekte’’ (spleen sickness) because of the swollen spleen which they found on post-
mortem examination. The British vets employed as government officials in the Cape
Colony and Natal during the 1870s were also familiar with this fatal disease. The first
government vet at the Cape, William Catton Branford, saw cases of anthrax shortly after
his appointment in 1876. He advised farmers not to dismember the carcasses, but to bury
them intact with quicklime to prevent the contamination of the pasture with the anthrax
organism.
26
During the 1890s, the Cape government vets perceived anthrax as an increasingly
serious and widespread hazard. Otto Henning, a state-employed vet who worked in the
commercialcattle-ranchingareasoftheNorthernCapeandBritishBechuanaland(annexed
totheCapein1895),thoughtthediseasewasgainingasignificantholdandthatsomefarms
had become badly contaminated. Following the British victoryin the South African War in
1901, newly-appointed veterinary officials found that contiguous parts of the Western
Transvaal, an area which Milner’s reconstruction government had prioritized for the
development of settler cattle farming, had acquired an ‘‘evil reputation’’ for anthrax
among local farmers.
27 The vets also became increasingly concerned about the prevalence
of the disease along the roads between the ports of the Eastern Cape and the Transkei. Both
white and African transport riders, the vets claimed, frequently left anthrax carcasses
unburied were they had fallen, causing long-term contamination. Some ‘‘outspans’’ on
the transport riding routes were allegedly hotbeds of infection.
28
During the 1910s, government vets became convinced that the large majority of anthrax
cases went unreported and that the disease was far more common than the official statistics
suggested.
29 In this regard, the intensified veterinary supervision that followed the imposi-
tion of the East Coast fever regulations (which required the submission of blood smears for
everycattledeathinproclaimedareas)intheTranskeiduring1910enabledofficialstogain
aclearerinsight.Thenumberofcasesdetectedrosedramaticallyafter theimpositionofthe
25DGilfoyle,‘Veterinaryimmunologyascolonial
science:methodandquantificationintheinvestigation
of horsesickness in South Africa, c.1905–1945’, J.
Hist. Med. Allied Sci., 2006, 61: 26–65. The phrase is
taken from D Wade Chambers and R Gillespie,
‘Locality in the history of science: colonial science,
technoscience and indigenous knowledge’, Osiris,
2000, 15: 221–40.
26Cape of Good Hope [G.8–1877], Report of the
colonial veterinary surgeon on sheep and cattle
diseases in the Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope, Cape Town, Government Printer,
1877, p. 20.
27Milton, ‘The Tranvaal beef frontier’, op. cit.,
note 11 above, p. 199; A Theiler and C E Gray,
‘Veterinary hygienic principles applicable to stock in
South Africa’, Transvaal Agricultural Journal, 1906,
4: 771–91, p. 783.
28CapeofGoodHope[G.41–1904],Reportsofthe
ChiefVeterinarySurgeonandtheAssistantVeterinary
Surgeons for the year 1903, Cape Town, Government
Printer, 1904, p. 60.
29D Kehoe, ‘Anthrax in South Africa’, in The fifth
and sixth reports of the Director of Veterinary
Services, April 1918, Pretoria, Government Printer,
1919, pp. 211–53, esp. p. 215.
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30 and a similar increase followed the proclamation of the Eastern Cape dis-
tricts of Kingwilliamstown and East London shortly afterwards.
31 The vets believed that
without the regulations most of these outbreaks would have gone undetected, and specu-
lated that closer inspection would reveal a similar picture in other parts of the country.
32
Nevertheless, the annual number of reported deaths from anthrax remained quite small.
During 1920, for example, 1,891 outbreaks of the disease were reported in South Africa,
killingjustover6,000cattle.
33Whilethenumberofdeathswassmallasapercentageofthe
overall population of approximately 6 million cattle, the vets emphasized the potential for
the disease to contaminate farms and make them unworkable. Throughout the 1910s they
accordingly pressed for the enforcement of measures of control.
34
The initial motivation for a more thorough policy of control and prevention after 1920,
however, lay in the threat anthrax posed to human health abroad.
35 In Britain and America
there was, during the 1910s, continuing concern about the small but persistent number of
cases of anthrax infection among workers handling imported wool and hair. The chief
danger was the inhalation of the anthrax organism, which caused the potentially fatal
‘‘woolsorters’’’ disease. During 1916, the United States government promulgated regula-
tions requiring the disinfection of animal products from regions in which anthrax was
prevalent.
36 The American consul immediatelyrefusedtocertifyhidesfrom the Transvaal,
effectively closing the American market to South African producers.
37
30In 1905, before the imposition of the East Coast
regulationonly16caseswerereportedintheTranskei.
By1913,thefigurestoodat116,risingto265in1920.
Union of South Africa [U.G.47–1913], Report of the
Department of Agriculture, 1
st January 1912 to 31
st
March 1913, Pretoria, Government Printing and
Stationery Office, 1913, p. 55; Union of South Africa
[U.G.13–1921], Annual report of the Department of
Agriculture, 1919–1920, Pretoria, Government
Printing and Stationery Office, 1921, p. 20. P R
Viljoen, H H Curson and P J J Fourie, ‘Anthrax in
South Africa with reference to improved methods of
protective inoculation’, in 13
th and 14
th reports of the
Director of Veterinary Education and Research, Part
I. October 1928, Pretoria, Government Printing and
Stationery Office, 1928, pp. 431–535, on pp. 447–9.
31Union of South Africa [U.G.47–1913], Annual
report of the Department of Agriculture, 1
st January
1912 to 31
st March 1913, Pretoria, Government
PrintingandStationeryOffice,1913,p.55;Kehoe,op.
cit.,note29 above,pp.215–17;Viljoen,et al.,op. cit.,
note 30 above, pp. 437–8.
32UnionofSouthAfrica[U.G.47–1913],Reportof
theDepartmentofAgriculture,1
stJanuary1912to31
st
March 1913, Pretoria, Government Printing and
StationeryOffice, 1913, p. 55; Kehoe, op. cit., note29
above, p. 215; Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30 above,
pp. 438, 454.
33Union of South Africa, [U.G.13–1921], Annual
report of the Director of Agriculture, 1919–1920,
Pretoria, Government Printing and Stationery Office,
1921, p. 20.
34For example, Theiler and Gray, op. cit., note 27
above, p. 784; Union of South Africa [U.G.5–1918],
Annual report of the Department of Agriculture,
1916–1917, Pretoria, Government Printing and
Stationery Office, 1918, p. 32; Union of South Africa
[U.G.39–1918], Annual report of the Department of
Agriculture, 1917–1918, Pretoria, Government
Printing and Stationery Office, 1918, p. 40; Union of
South Africa [U.G.40–1919], Annual report of the
Department of Agriculture, 1918–1919, Pretoria,
Government Printing and Stationery Office, 1919,
p. 36.
35A small number of cases of anthrax were
reported annually in South Africa, usually in Africans
who had handled cattle hides. See correspondence in
South African Nation Archives Depot (SABE) ARB
121 CF161/10/2.
36‘Regulations governing the certification and
disinfection of hides, fleshings, hide cuttings, parings,
and glue stock, sheepskins and goatskins and parts
thereof,hair,wool,andotheranimalby-products,hay,
straw,forage,orsimilarmaterialofferedforentryinto
the United States’, Board of Trade Journal, 21 Dec.
1912.
37SABEGG185454/509,ConsulGeneral,United
States of America to the Governor-General of the
Union of South Africa, 12 Feb. 1917.
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Daniel GilfoyleWith regard to Britain, the major export market for South African wool and mohair, the
situation was potentially more serious. In 1910, the Anthrax Investigation Board of Brad-
ford detected anthrax in samples of bloodstained South African mohair.
38 A Departmental
Committee on anthrax (appointed in 1914) recommended the construction of a pilot
disinfection plant to treat wool and mohair from countries in which contamination was
likely.
39 It also evaluated the prevalence of anthrax and measures for its control in the
exporting colonies. The Committee found that the situation in Australia and New Zealand
was satisfactory, but the lack of efficient controls in Egypt and India meant that their
products would require disinfection.
40 The position with regard to South Africa was less
clear. The Committee found that ‘‘the state of civilisation’’ there was sufficient for anthrax
to be ‘‘stamped out’’, but ‘‘the desirability of applying disinfection would have to be
considered’’.
41
Given the importance of wool and other pastoral exports to the South African economy,
the perceived threat to trade caused some alarm among the South African government.
Officials in the Department of Agriculture calculated that should Britain impose compul-
sory disinfection, the estimated surcharge of around one and a half pence per pound in
weight of wool would entail a cost of over £1,000,000 per annum to producers.
42 Further-
more, they were in danger of being excluded from the group of settler colonies and
classified with India and Egypt, a prospect that fitted ill with the government’s ‘‘progres-
sive’’ and segregationist ideology. In 1918, a Central Wool Committee, set up under
Barney Enslin, the head of the Division of Sheep, was extremely critical of current
practices in the wool trade, in which fleeces were stored indiscriminately with blood-
stained cattle hides, believed to be the major source of infection.
43 The Department of
Agriculture, anxious to publicize the anthrax problem, issued a press circular emphasizing
the threat to producers.
44 At the same time the Chief Veterinary Surgeon, Charles Gray,
warned that, ‘‘Unless stock owners bestir themselves and take this disease more seriously,
it is more than likely that other countries will place an embargo upon the introduction of
38SABE GG 1848 54/175, E Blackwell, Home
Office to Under Secretary for State, Colonial Office,
16 Dec. 1911.
39Great Britain, Departmental Committee on
Anthrax, Report of the Departmental Committee
appointed to inquire as to precautions for preventing
danger of infection from anthrax in the manipulation
ofwool,goathair,andcamelhair.Volume1.Reportof
the Disinfection Sub-committee, Cd. 9057, London,
HMSO, 1918. For an account of the disinfection plant
at Liverpool, see I Mortimer and J Melling, ‘‘‘The
contest between commerce and trade, on the one side,
and human life on the other’’: British government
policies for the regulation of anthrax infection and the
wool textiles industries, 1880–1939’, Textile History,
2000, 31: 222–36, pp. 227–32.
40Australian wool producers, particularly in New
SouthWales,hadsufferedfromseriousproblemswith
anthrax infection during the late nineteenth and early
twentiethcenturies.Thevaccinationofsheepwasused
extensively as a means of control. J Todd, Colonial
technology: science and the transfer of technology in
Australia, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
41Great Britain, Departmental Committee on
Anthrax, Report of the Departmental Committee
appointed to inquire as to precautions for preventing
dangerofinfectionbymanipulationofwool,goathair,
and camel hair. Vol. II. Report of the Committee, Cd.
9057, London HMSO, 1918.
42Union of South Africa, Department of
Agriculture, Press Circular No. 9/1919, ‘Anthrax in
wool and mohair’, 5 July 1919, p. 4.
43Union of South Africa, Department of
Agriculture, Report by the Central Wool Committee
dealingwiththetradeinwool,mohair,skins,andhides
in South Africa, and recommendations to effect
improvements in the present systems, Pretoria,
Government Printing and Stationery Office, 1918,
pp. 1, 3.
44Union of South Africa, Department of
Agriculture, Press Circular No. 9/1919, ‘Anthrax in
wool and mohair’, 5 July 1919.
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945animal products from South Africa, which will react detrimentally upon the prosperity of
the farmer’’.
45
At the Colonial Office, Lord Milner, who had supervised the construction of a unified
South African state, was apparently anxious that the colony’s products should continue to
be exempt from disinfection. He sought assurances from the Governor-General that South
Africa was doing everything in its power to ensure the prevention and eradication of
anthrax.
46 When the disinfection plant, which was situated in Liverpool, came into opera-
tion in July 1921, Egyptian and Indian wool and goat hair were subject to compulsory
disinfection, while South African products remained for the time being exempt.
47 Never-
theless, the problem of the contamination of South African products remained. In Novem-
ber 1922, the ColonialOfficewarned the Governor-Generalthat investigators had detected
the anthrax organism in Cape mohair on eleven occasions between September 1921 and
August 1922.
48
After the First World War, efforts to protect textile workers against infection became
internationalized. The International Labour Office set up an Anthrax Commission to
investigate the disease around the world. In 1922, the Commission, which was attended
by the Cape’s Senior Veterinary Officer, Rowland Dixon,
49 reported that the Liverpool
disinfection plant had been successful in reducing the incidence of infection and recom-
mended the establishment of other plants in producing countries where anthrax was
prevalent. South African mohair was mentioned specifically as a likely source of infec-
tion.
50 Dixon returned to South Africa urging the need to instigate more effective measures
of control. In fact, the threat of compulsory disinfection declined from the mid-1920s, as
the British Treasury resisted further expenditure on the Liverpool plant and the Interna-
tional Labour Commission failed to pass a convention requiring universal disinfection of
wool and hair, instead concentrating on the threat posed by contaminated cattle hides.
51
Nevertheless, in 1928 Petrus du Toit, as the newly appointed head of South Africa’s
veterinary services, warned of the continued vigilance of the health section of the League
of Nations. Compulsory disinfection would, he reiterated, impose a substantial cost on
South African producers.
52 If the threat of embargoes faded by the 1930s, however,
officials in South Africa continued to stress the potential of the disease to contaminate
pastures, and anthrax remained a major veterinary preoccupation.
45Union of South Africa [U.G.39–1918], Annual
report of Director of Agriculture for 1917–18,
Pretoria, Government Printing and Stationery Office,
1918, p. 40. For press reports in a similar vein, see
Cape Times, 9 Aug. 1920, ‘Anthrax in Union—Chief
Veterinary Surgeon’s warning to stock owners’; Cape
Argus, 9 Aug. 1920, ‘Prevalence of anthrax—a
growing menace—Veterinary Officer’s warning’;
Journal of the Department of Agriculture, 1922, 4:8 ;
1922, 5: 394–5.
46SABE GG 1855 54/597, Lord Milner, Colonial
OfficetotheOfficerAdministeringtheGovernmentof
the Union of South Africa, 11 Sept. 1920.
47Great Britain, Home Office, Prevention of
anthraxamongstindustrialworkers:memorandumon
the disinfecting station established in Great
Britain for disinfection of wool and hair, London,
HMSO, 1921.
48SABE GG 1856 54/655, Colonial Office to
Governor-General, 18 Nov. 1922.
49R W Dixon, ‘The anthrax problem’, Journal of
the Department of Agriculture, 1923, 6: 529–38.
50Great Britain, International Anthrax
Commission, Memorandum circulated by the British
Representative, London, HMSO, 1922, p. 7.
51Mortimer and Melling, op. cit., note 39 above,
p. 230.
52P J du Toit,‘The veterinary serviceof the Union
of South Africa’, JSAVMA, 1928, 1: 9–28, p. 12.
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Daniel GilfoyleThe Veterinary Conception of ‘‘South African Anthrax’’
and Control to the 1930s
The framing of regulations aimed at the control of anthrax in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries depended on contemporary understandings of the causal organ-
ism, Bacillus anthracis, which had been extensively investigated by Robert Koch during
the late 1870s.
53 As an infected animal approached death, its blood swarmed with millions
of the bacilli in the vegetative (multiplicative) form. Once it died, the conditions necessary
for the multiplication of the bacilli failed. At moderate temperatures and in the presence of
free oxygen, they transformed into inert, highly resistant spores. As the carcass disinte-
grated, the spores, which could remain viable for an indeterminate period, were deposited
on the pasture. If spores entered the blood-stream of a grazing animal through abrasions in
the mouth or alimentary tract, they returned to the vegetative state, setting up fatal disease
and repeating the cycle of infection and contamination. Anthrax, however, was not con-
sidered a contagious disease which passed directly from an infected to a healthy animal.
54
The South African Stock Diseases Act of 1911, which consolidated existing legislation
in the various colonies relating to anthrax (and other contagious and infectious animal
diseases), was drafted to deal with the ability of Bacillus anthracis to contaminate through
sporulation.
55 The regulations required owners to report all suspicious deaths to the police
or veterinary officials and to submit a blood smear, taken from a small cut in the ear, for
laboratory examination. They expressly forbade the opening or dismemberment of the
carcass for meat, as this would lead to sporulation and the contamination of the pasture.
Owners were required to cremate the carcass promptly or to bury it deeply with quicklime.
If the smear tested positive, owners were required to fence off the immediate area to
prevent the infection of other animals. As the incubation period of anthrax was short, vets
enforced only a brief quarantine to detect associated cases.
56
These aspects of the South African regulations were based largely upon the British
model, which insisted on the control of anthrax by hygienic measures without recourse to
Pasteurian vaccination.
57 Since the rinderpest (cattle plague) epizootic of the mid-1860s,
when this disease had been eradicated through the rigorous application of quarantine,
slaughter and import embargoes, British veterinary policy had followed a particular tra-
jectory.BasedonwhatMichaelWorboyshascalled‘‘importationtheory’’,
58itaimedatthe
eradication of contagious and infectious diseases through slaughter and the prevention of
reinfection through import embargoes. With regard toanthrax,this policy was the outcome
of several factors which made eradication through hygienic measures an achievable aim.
Anthrax was a relatively rare disease in Britain and the state had sufficient resources to
detectcases.Furthermore,giventheinsularnatureofthecountry,itwaspossibletoprevent
53Koch’s explication of the aetiology of anthrax
was the basis of his famous ‘‘postulates’’ for
establishing a micro-organism as cause of a disease.
C Kodell Carter, ‘The Koch–Pasteur dispute in
establishing the cause of anthrax’, Bull. Hist. Med.,
1988, 62 (1): 42–57.
54J MacFadyean, ‘Anthrax’, J. Comp. Pathol.
Ther., 1901, 14: 52–5.
55Union of South Africa, Act No. 14, 1911.
56Kehoe, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 230.
57Pasteur’s vaccine had been available since the
early 1880s. For accounts of the development and
demonstration of Pasteurian vaccination, see Geison,
op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 151–9; B Latour, The
Pasteurization of France, Cambridge, MA, and
London, Harvard University Press, 1988.
58Worboys, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 56–60,
on p. 59.
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945the importation of infected animals. Thus, the British veterinary authorities relied on
hygienic measures and discouraged vaccination, which they believed could occasionally
cause infection.
59
By the early twentieth century, however, British-trained veterinary officials in South
Africa were convinced that a policy of relying on hygiene alone would fail to control
anthrax, given various local circumstances. In contrast to the British example, vaccination
became an important element of public policy from the 1910s. There were several reasons
for this, which related to the conditions of cattle production in the region and ideas about
the nature of the disease itself. The vets considered that the strict enforcement of the
regulations under the local conditions of predominantly extensive pastoralism in both
white and African areas was impossible. The power of the state to detect outbreaks
was limited by the relative weakness of its administration and policing on the ground.
Vetsworkinginthefieldknewfromexperiencethatmanystockownersdidnotreportcases
if they thought these were likely to go undetected by officials. In this regard, the veterinary
discussion of the nature of the anthrax problem assumed a distinctly racist tone.
According to one government vet, Andrew Goodall, African stockowners were ‘‘in the
front rank of all our transmitting agents’’,
60 while the senior vet, Philip Viljoen argued
that, ‘‘There is unfortunately a further complication, namely, the native who, generally
speaking, is careless in his farming methods and, above all, does not understand food
hygiene’’.
61
Veterinary officials thought that there were three centres of particularly dense anthrax
contamination: the Northern Cape districts, such as Vryburg,which had formerly been part
ofBritishBechuanalandandwhichhadbeenannexedtotheCapein1895,theTranskeiand
the Witwatersrand.
62 In all three areas, they associated anthrax infection with African-
owned cattle and linked its persistence and spread to African practices. The key problem,
the vets argued, was that in cases of anthrax Africans flouted the regulations by removing
the saleable hide and cutting up the carcass for meat. The Irish veterinarian Daniel Kehoe,
who studied anthrax in South Africa during the 1910s, reported that the disease was
common along the Witwatersrand, a relatively urbanized area in which gold mining
was the principal economic activity. As urbanization based on mining progressed, the
increasing number of Africans living in compounds and locations along the Rand provided
a growing market for milk and meat. Kehoe reported that there were many milch cows on
unfenced plots around the African townships. When an animal died, he alleged, the owner
typically evaded the municipal sanitary charge for disposal of the carcass by allowing
‘‘mine natives’’ to cut it up for meat. This, argued the vets, was an efficient means of
disseminating anthrax infection across a comparatively densely populated area.
63 These
hides were a prime meansof contaminating wooland mohair intendedforexport,while the
59J MacFadyean, ‘Anthrax’, J. Comp. Pathol.
Ther., 1894, 7 (4): 325–22, and idem, ‘Anthrax’, J.
Comp. Pathol. Ther., 1898, 11, 1: 51–68.
60A Goodall, ‘Leba’, ‘The anthrax problem in
Southern Africa: mode of spread of disease and
practical suggestions for suppression’, thesis
submitted for fellowship of the Royal College of
Veterinary Surgeons, 1921, p. 8.
61Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30 above, p. 450.
Viljoen was one of the first Afrikaners to qualify as a
vet and later served as Secretary for Agriculture.
62Union of South Africa [U.G. 47–1913], Annual
report of the Department of Agriculture, 1
st January,
1912 to 31
st March, 1913, Pretoria, Government
Printing and Stationery Office, 1913, p. 55.
63Kehoe, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 226.
476
Daniel Gilfoylepractice of dismemberment allowed the sporulation and more widespread distribution of
the bacilli.
64 The vets, however, did not think that these practices were necessarily rooted
in ignorance. Africans were familiar with the disease and seemingly aware of the dangers.
According to the botanist, Andrew Smith (writing in the late nineteenth century), Africans
rendered infected meat harmless by boiling it with certain herbs, such as Zanthoxylon capen-
sis, then referred to as wild cardamom.
65 The vets, however, had apparently little interest
in investigating the possible disinfectant properties of these plants, even though they
were uncertain whether boiling alone was always an effective means of sterilizing meat.
66
Thus, while European farmers were not exonerated, veterinary officials tended to cast
the problem of anthrax controlasonewhich relatedparticularly toAfricans.Inthe reserves
of the Northern Cape and the Transkei, where African stockowners grazed their herds on
communal pastures, places where large numbers of cattle collected regularly, such as
watering points, could become badly contaminated with anthrax spores. Veterinary policy
makers believed that they lacked the resources to impose comprehensive measures of
hygiene in African areas. In the words of one vet, the suppression of anthrax in areas
occupied primarily or wholly by Africans ‘‘presents tremendous difficulties’’, because of
extensive communal pastures.
67
Furthermore, in South Africa anthrax seemed to display particular characteristics. As in
Britain, it appeared to be primarily a disease of cattle rather than sheep (as in France and
Australia), although the vets admitted that cases in sheep would be difficult to detect under
conditions of extensive farming.
68 The contamination of fleeces probably resulted from
contact with other materials, such as cattle hides, rather than from infection in the sheep.
Thus, the vets thought that contamination of wool and mohair was a function of infection
among cattle.
69 The vets found a partial explanation for this in the grazing habits of the
different species of domestic animals. On the grasslands of Griqualand West in the North-
ern Cape, where anthrax was common, cattle grazed the grass closely and were liable to
pick up spores from the soil. Infection was more likely if prickly pear was present, because
the spiny skins could puncture the mouths of grazing animals, thereby providing a means
for spores to enter the bloodstream.
70 In the Karoo, where the disease was virtually
unknown, sheep fed upon the leaves of bushes away from the ground and were therefore
lesslikelytoingestspores.Thecomparativefrequencyofinfectionincattlewasthesubject
of some speculation. ResearchersatOnderstepoortfoundit difficultto infect cattle even by
64Agricultural Journal of the Union of South
Africa, 1912, 3 (2), Supplement, p. 2; Union of South
Africa [U.G.13–1921], Annual report of the
Department of Agriculture, 1919–1920, Pretoria,
Government Printing and Stationery Office, 1921,
p.20;Kehoe,op.cit.,note29above,pp.213,225,227,
235,238;Viljoen,etal.,op.cit.,note30above,p.450.
65Kehoe,op.cit.,note29above,p.225;ASmithof
St Cyrus, A contribution of South African materia
medica, chiefly from plants in use among the natives,
Capetown and Johannesburg, Juta, 1895, pp. 55, 58.
Smith lists six plants which were used as disinfectants
or antidotes. Smith comments that boiling itself might
have been effective in disinfecting meat.
66Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30 above, p. 433.
67Goodall, op. cit., note 60 above, p. 8.
68For descriptions of anthrax in sheep in France
and Australia, see Geison, op. cit., note 15 above, pp.
145–6, Todd, op. cit., note 40 above, pp. 37–8, 66–85.
In South Africa, however, one vet estimated that
around two-thirds of outbreaks of anthrax in South
Africa involved cattle only. Goodall, op. cit., note 60
above, p. 6; Viljoen et al., op. cit., note 30
above, p. 459.
69Union of South Africa, Report by the Central
Wool Committee, op. cit., note 43 above.
70Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30 above,
pp.449–50.Pasteurhaddemonstratedthatsheepwere
more likely be become infected if thistles were mixed
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945injecting very large amounts of virulent material, but infection was quite common in
nature. It was possible that strains of extreme virulence existed in South Africa, which
caused frequent outbreaks in the relatively resistant bovine.
71 Thus, the species principally
affected was of relatively high unit value, which tended to make vaccination an economic-
ally justifiable practice.
Vets in South Africa tended to stress the importance of environmental factors in the
transmission and dissemination of anthrax. If British veterinarians regarded Bacillus
anthracis as an ‘‘obligatory’’ parasite, propagating only in the living animal, little was
known about how the organism behaved in nature. Given the appropriate environmental
conditions, the vets speculated, it might be able to multiply outside the body. Watering
holes were important locations for the transmission ofthe bacilli,which were possiblyable
to proliferate in damp soils, rich with decaying matter.
72 Climate too seemed to have some
bearing, as outbreaks were more common after the commencement of summer rains.
73
While they agreed that the original source of contamination was the carcass of an infected
animal, vets noted a tendency for the disease to spread along watercourses and surmised
that flowing water carried spores downstream.
74 Carrion-eating mammals and birds were
highly resistant to anthrax, but they probably disseminated the spores over wide areas by
depositing them in their excreta. While outbreaks were usually localized affairs that
producedrelativelyfewdeaths,anthraxsometimesassumedanepidemicform,particularly
among horses. This was especially the case in Griqualand West and the Western Orange
Free State, where the horsefly (Hippobosca rufipes) proliferated. Vets believed that
this fly could carry Bacillus anthracis rapidly beyond the immediate centre of infection,
causing localized epidemics, a theory which had also been advanced in the United
States.
75 Given these observations, it seemed possible that Bacillus anthracis was not
entirely dependent on the infected animal for propagation and transmission. The evidence
suggested that slaughter and hygiene would not be an entirely effective method of
controlling the disease.
These considerations meant that, as in much of Western Europe, Australia and United
States, where anthrax was widely disseminated across extensive grasslands, vaccination
was an important component of state veterinarystrategy tocontrol anthrax inSouthAfrica.
Unlike in Britain, veterinary officials actively encouraged the use of Pasteur’s vaccine to
protect in-contact animals in individual outbreaks.
76 Vaccine was first imported to the
Cape from France in the early 1880s, soon after its initial demonstration, but the amount
used remained small until the promulgation of the Stock Diseases Act of 1911, which
empowered government vets to enforce the vaccination of in-contacts at the owner’s
expense. Voluntary vaccination, however, was also increasingly popular among the
71Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30 above, p. 464.
72Kehoe, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 218.
73Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30 above, p. 455.
74Kehoe, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 230.
75This theory was first advanced by the Cape
government vet, Otto Henning in 1892 after attending
outbreaksofanthraxinhorsesaroundKimberley.MW
Henning, Animal diseases in South Africa,
Johannesburg, Central News Agency, 1948, p. 12.
Abstract, ‘Blood-sucking insects as transmitters of
anthrax’,J.Comp.Pathol.Ther.,1918,31:134–6.The
horsefly theory was later accepted at Onderstepoort
after Bacillus anthracis was isolated from
hipposboscid flies. Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30
above, p. 452.
76SABE LDE 2760 123, Notice to Farmers
4828–10/7/14–3000.
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Daniel Gilfoylestock-owning public, so that the annual issue of anthrax vaccine increased from around
40,000 doses in 1911 to 1,200,000 in 1920.
77
Given the perceived threat of the compulsory disinfection of wool exports during the
early 1920s, the state, now ‘‘prepared to do everything in its power to get the disease under
proper control’’, instigated a more determined policy of prevention based on the avail-
ability of sufficient effective vaccine.
78 While veterinary scientists continued to stress the
importance of hygienic measures, they increasingly encouraged vaccination, which
expanded accordingly.
79 Until 1915, Onderstepoort imported vaccine from the Pasteur
Institute in Paris, but when the First World War interrupted the supply Theiler instructed
Kehoe to initiate local production. During 1922, Theiler pressed for legislation giving
Onderstepoort control of the supply of anthrax vaccine. As vaccination was now being
carried out on a large scale, he argued, the South African farmer needed protection against
unduly expensive and possibly defective imported products, which might introduce other
infections. It was equally important to prevent the marketing of potentially dangerous
vaccines by local amateurs.
80 Regulations promulgated in 1923 empowered Onderstepoort
to forbid the importation of any vaccine from abroad and to suppress local manufacture, a
policy that was carried out vigorously.
81 In effect, Onderstepoort obtained a monopoly of
the supply of anthrax vaccine within the country.
Ifvets could oblige stockowners tovaccinate in-contactanimalsduring any outbreak,by
theearly1920stheybelievedthatthecostofthevaccine tendedtodiscouragefarmersfrom
reporting.
82 To overcome this problem, the government began, from July 1923, to issue
free vaccine to stockowners upon request.
83 Thereafter the use of the vaccine increased
rapidly, so that by 1925 Onderstepoort was issuing approximately 2.5 million doses
annually.
84 From the point of view of the veterinary field service, the issue of free vaccine
considerably aided control by encouraging notification as required by the Act. The policy
continued until 1936, by which time the vets believed that farmers were misusing or
wasting large amounts and reintroduced a charge.
85 Vaccine was still substantially sub-
sidized, however, as the levy of two shillings and sixpence per hundred doses was a quarter
of the estimated cost of production. After 1936, the Department of Native Affairs paid for
the vaccination of African-owned stock, except in the Transkei, where it was funded out of
the existing cattle-dipping tax.
86 Policy towards the racial groups, however, was different,
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945as vaccination of African-owned livestock was more tightly controlled, with government
vets or stock inspectors performing the operation rather than the owners themselves.
87
Furthermore, senior vets argued that, given the inadequacies of detection, the best
method of control and prevention was the compulsory annual vaccination of all cattle
in areas considered severely or extensively infected.
88 During the 1920s and 1930s,
however, the state enforced compulsory vaccination in African areas only. This was
determined by the vets’ racially biased explanation of the incidence of anthrax and by
asymmetric relations of political power between the state, its European constituency and
disenfranchized Africans in a segregationist society. Compulsory vaccination was initially
enforced across individual African locations during the 1920s at the behest of European
farmers in Northern Cape districts such as Barkly West. Here African locations holding
large numbers of cattle lay in close proximity to white commercial ranches.
89
If local European concerns about disease ‘‘reservoirs’’ lay behind this piecemeal vac-
cination, a more systematic and overarching policy of ‘‘block’’ vaccination began to
emerge in the late 1920s, particularly with regard to the Transkeian Territories. The
execution of compulsory ‘‘block’’ vaccination was associated with John Nicol, a British-
trained vet appointed, in 1928, Chief Veterinary Officer for the Transkei by Petrus du Toit,
who was now in charge of field services. Since joining the Cape Veterinary Department in
1910,NicolhadaccruedmuchexperienceofworkingamongAfricansandtheirstockinthe
Eastern Cape and the Transkei, where his major task had been the enforcement of the East
Coast fever regulations. In August 1928, after consulting with the resident magistrate (the
head administrative officer), Nicol began the inoculation of all the cattle in Engcobo, a
districtinthewestern Transkeiwhich usuallyaccountedforaquarter ofthetotalnumberof
cases detected in the Territories.
90 Vaccination seems to have been politically uncontro-
versialandit wasrarely mentioned inthediscussionsoftheTranskei’sgoverningbody,the
General Council. Comment was favourable, apart from some discussion on how the costs
should be allocated.
91 Some Transkeian stockowners were already using free vaccine on a
voluntary basis and there were the precedents of earlier inoculations against rinderpest and
‘‘lungsickness’’ (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia).
92
The anthrax situation in the Transkei came to be of special interest to the vets because
theybelievedthattheoperationoftheEastCoastfeverregulationsgave themaparticularly
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above; Gilfoyle, op. cit., note 10 above, pp. 306–12.
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Daniel Gilfoyleaccurate picture of the incidence of the disease there. The regulations, which had been
in force in the Transkei since 1910, entailed a strong element of social control, limiting
the free movement of cattle and enforcing regular insecticidal dipping.
93 In 1929, du Toit
and his colleagues at Onderstepoort, now formally directing field services, initiated a
policyof‘‘intensivecontrol’’,whichrequiredstockinspectorstotakearegulartwo-weekly
census of cattle in proclaimed areas, while blood smears for diagnostic examination
were taken from any cattle that died or were slaughtered. The vets believed that as
‘‘intensive control’’ of East Coast fever would enable them to detect any cases of anthrax
thatoccurredintheTranskei,theywouldobtainaccuratedataontherateanddistributionof
infection.
94
Inthisregard,thevetsperceivedcompulsoryvaccinationinEngcobotobeanimmediate
success. Nicol reported that during the year following the introduction of immunization,
the number of outbreaks recorded in Engcobo dropped from 61 to 15. Although the
government’s own statistics showed that anthrax was no more common in the Transkei
than in some other major cattle holding areas, the vets targeted it for a pilot anthrax
vaccination ‘‘campaign’’. Accordingly, Nicol, in collaboration with the magistrates,
extended compulsory vaccination to the rest of the western districts of the Transkei in
1929 and to the whole of the Territories by 1934. The only exception was the settler-
dominated district of Mount Currie, where vaccination remained voluntary.
95 By 1942,
Nicol announced that his staff were overseeing the annual vaccination of over 1,600,000
cattle in the Transkei—virtually complete coverage.
96
During the early 1930s, compulsory annual vaccination was extended to other African
reserves in various parts of the country. Coverage was less complete than in the Transkei,
with ‘‘campaigns’’ targeted at ‘‘blocks’’ of territory thought to be severelyaffected. Never-
theless, officials conducted these operations on a large scale. In 1933, the Secretaries for
AgricultureandNativeAffairs,actingonveterinaryadvice,ordered theannualvaccination
of over a quarter of a million head of cattle in five districts in Northern Zululand.
97 The
policy was extended further in Natal, so that by 1937, compulsory vaccination was in force
in 101 different African reserves and in locations throughout Natal and Zululand, entailing
the treatment of over a million cattle every year.
98 Compulsory vaccination was intensified
in the Griqualand West area, where wholesale vaccination was ordered whenever a case of
93For an account of popular opposition to the East
Coast fever regulations during the 1910s, see Bundy,
op. cit. note 12 above.
94GdeKock,CJvanHeerden,RduToitandWO
Neitz, ‘Bovine theileriosis in South Africa,with
special reference to Theileria mutans’, OJVSAI, 1937,
8: 9–128, pp. 9–10; A M Diesel, ‘The campaign
against East Coast fever in South Africa’, OJVSAI,
1948, 23 (1 and 2): 19–31, p. 29.
95The eleven districts were Elliotdale, Engcobo,
Libode, Mqanduli, Ngqeleni, Qumbu, St Marks,
Tsolo, Tsomo, Umtata, Xalanga, essentially the
western part of the Transkei. Mount Currie was
extensively settled by Europeans in the 1870s and
remainedlargely in white hands.Nicol,op. cit.,note 2
above,p.47;Sterne,etal.,op.cit.,note1above,p.54;
Beinart,‘Theanatomyofaruralscare’,op.cit.,note12
above, pp. 49–51.
96Nicol, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 55.
97The five districts were Nongoma, Hlabisa,
Mahlabatini, Nbombo and Ingwavuma. SABE BAO
5826 2/316 vol. 2, Secretary for Agriculture to
Secretary for Native Affairs, 8 June 1933; Secretary
for Native Affairs to Chief Native Commissioner,
Pietermaritzburg, 26 June 1933.
98SABE LBD 4863 Z1002/16 vol. 2, D Edwards,
Government Veterinary Officer, Louis Trichardt to
Senior Veterinary Officer, Pretoria, 20 Dec. 1935; J L
Dixon, Government Veterinary Officer to Senior
Veterinary Officer, Pretoria, 15 Nov. 1936; D
Edwards, Government Veterinary Officer to Senior
Veterinary Officer, Pretoria, 7 Dec. 1936.
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945anthrax was reported in a particular reserve.
99 Officials initiated similar measures across
the Transvaal so that, by the late 1930s, annual compulsory vaccination was in place in
fifty-seven African reserves, entailing the treatment of over one-quarter of a million cattle
each year.
100 During 1940, more than 6 million head of cattle, half the total South African
population, were vaccinated.
101 South African officials also encouraged vaccination in
neighbouring states by offering to export vaccine to Swaziland, Basutoland (Lesotho),
South West Africa and Bechuanaland (Botswana) at the price of five shillings per hundred
doses, substantially below the estimated cost of production.
102
Experimenting with Anthrax: Max Sterne, the Invention of an ‘‘Avirulent’’
Vaccine and the Experimental Function of Mass Vaccination
If vaccination was in force extensively with an apparent degree of success in South
Africa by the 1930s, the practice was not without problems of safety and effectiveness.
Difficulties with imported systems of vaccination and associated technology meant that
these were subject to critical review by veterinary scientists at Onderstepoort, where an
experimental approach to the production and use of vaccine evolved from the mid-1910s
through to the 1940s. During the 1930s, the results obtained by mass compulsory vaccina-
tion of African-owned cattle came to fulfil an important function in these experiments.
TheactiveconstituentofthevaccinefirstmanufacturedinSouthAfricaduring1915was
an attenuated strain of the bacillus obtained from the Pasteur Institute in Paris. The key
variable determining the safety and efficacy of vaccine was thought to be the degree to
which the pathogenic property of the bacilli was reduced through attenuation, achieved by
heating according to Pasteur’s method.
103 In terms of contemporary theory, the bacilli
neededtobeattenuatedtoapointatwhichtheycouldnolongercausedisease,butwerestill
capable of conferring immunity by stimulating the production of antibodies within the
body. The question of attenuation was complicated by variability in the susceptibility of
different species of domestic animals. Vets believed, for example, that horses and angora
goats were more susceptible than cattle and sheep, so their safe immunization required
a more attenuated vaccine. In practice, Pasteurian vaccination consisted of two
injections, carried out approximately fourteen days apart. The first used highly attenuated
organisms to stimulate an initial immune response, while the second contained less atte-
nuated organisms, which produced immunity sufficient to prevent natural infection.
99For Vryburg, SABE BAO 5826 2/316 vol. 2,
Secretary for Native Affairs to Secretary for Finance,
15 Dec. 1930; for Kuruman, Secretary for Native
Affairs to Native Commissioner, Kuruman, 19 May
1931, and Senior Veterinary Officer, OFS to Director
of Veterinary Services, 23 Dec. 1931; for Mafeking,
Native Commissioner, Mafeking, to Secretary for
Native Affairs, 10 Dec. 1932; for Barkly West,
Superintendent of Locations to the Native
Commissioner, 13 March 1933; for Herbert,
Superintendent of Natives to Native Commissioner,
Herbert, 26 April 1933.
100SABE LBD 4863 Z1002/16 vol. 2, Memo,
‘NativeareasinTransvaal,whicharesubjecttoannual
anthrax inoculations’, undated, 1937.
101Sterne, et al., op. cit., note 1 above, p. 53.
102SABE LBD 4863 Z1002/16 vol. 2, Director of
Veterinary Services to Secretary for Agriculture and
Forestry, 21 Nov. 1936; Secretary for Agriculture and
Forestry, Pretoria, to Secretary for Agriculture and
Forestry, Maseru, 29 Jan. 1935.
103For a detailed account of Pasteur’s methods,
see Geison, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 151–69, esp.
pp. 156, 167.
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Daniel GilfoyleScientists considered that this protection lasted for little more that a year, so they recom-
mended annual vaccination as a means of maintaining continuous immunity.
104
Both vets and farmers criticized the Pasteur vaccine as its use expanded in South Africa
through the 1910s. As Jan Todd has argued for Australia, Pasteur’s system of double
vaccination was cumbersome under the conditions of extensive farming which similarly
characterizedSouth Africa.
105 Government vets also complained that the administration of
the vaccine, which required the marshalling of cattle on two separate occasions, was
particularly difficult among African-owned livestock on communally held land.
106 For
this reason, Kehoe initially concentrated on producing a single version of the vaccine, but
he found it difficult to strike a balance between safety and efficacy. The single vaccine
sometimes produced crippling swellings and even fatal disease in the animals (particularly
the more susceptible horse and angora goat) that it was supposed to protect. From March
1917, therefore, Theiler ordered the cessation of the single vaccine, except for use on cattle
when the circumstances made double vaccination impractical.
107
Apartfromsafety,stockownersalsocomplainedthatthevaccineattimesfailedtoconfer
sufficient protection because animals contracted anthrax during the year following inocu-
lation. Vets noted that vaccination occasionally failed to halt the progress of an outbreak in
a herd, suggesting that it did not always produce the required degree of immunity. They
considered that the most important reason for this was the poor keeping qualities of
Pasteurian vaccines based on the vegetative phase of the bacillus.
108 In 1922, they
began to use a spore-based vaccine along the lines of a product first devised in Australia
by the amateur bacteriologists John Gunn and John MacGarvie-Smith during the 1890s.
109
Their invention was designed to overcome the problem of deterioration during long-term
storage and transportation by exploiting the capacity of the bacillus to form resistant
spores, thus producing a vaccine which remained viable over long periods. More effective
than Pasteur’s vaccine under conditions of extensive pastoralism, spore vaccines were in
widespread use in America, Australia and Japan by the early 1920s, when they were first
produced at Onderstepoort.
110
ProductionofasporevaccinerequiredtheselectionofastrainofBacillusanthraciswith
strong immunizing qualities (different strains were thought to vary greatly in this regard).
Samples of strains were obtained from foreign bacteriological institutes or by isolating
organisms from local outbreaks. The selected strain of bacillus was attenuated by heating,
propagated in a liquid medium and then allowed to sporulate on solid agar in the presence
ofoxygen.
111Thescientistsusedsmalllaboratoryanimalstotestfortheappropriatedegree
of attenuation. The vaccine needed to be strong enough to kill the highly susceptible
guinea-pig, but was rejected as insufficiently attenuated if it killed the more resistant
rabbit. Tests to determine the efficacy of the vaccine, however, were carried out on
104Kehoe, op. cit., note 29 above, pp. 232–3, 244.
105For an account of anthrax vaccination in
Australia, see Todd, op. cit., note 40 above,
pp. 46–107.
106Archive of the Onderstepoort Veterinary
Institute (AOVI), box 65, file 10/5/2, C E Gray,
Principal Veterinary Officer, Pretoria, to Director of
Veterinary Research, 13 April 1920.
107Kehoe, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 244.
108Viljoen and Curson, op. cit., note 77 above,
p. 552.
109Todd, op. cit., note 40 above, pp. 76–7.
110Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30 above,
pp. 479, 526.
111Viljoen and Curson, op. cit., note 77 above,
p.552;Viljoen,etal.,op.cit.,note30above,pp.482–7.
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945sheep. Each vaccine dose needed to produce an immunity sufficient to protect the animal
from injection with one thousand minimum lethal doses of a standard unattenuated strain.
In practice, this meant that the size of the vaccine dose was adjusted until a point was
reached at which the challenge no longer killed the test sheep.
112 The improvements in
testing enabled the introduction of a single-dose spore vaccine, of which good results were
reported during the 1920s.
Nevertheless, stockowners and vets in the field continued to report some accidents and
failures. As Kehoe had argued during the late 1910s, accidents, while statistically unim-
portant, had a disproportionate impact on the public perception of vaccination, because
they tended to occur in clusters, causing serious hardship to local communities and thus
undermining public confidence.
113 They also suggested to Kehoe and his successor in
anthrax research, Philip Viljoen, that existing vaccines were in some way inadequate for
satisfactory immunization against anthrax in South Africa.
114 Since the early 1900s, when
Arnold Theiler demonstrated that in certain diseases immunity was specific to local strains
of a pathogenic organism, the idea that the immunity produced by infection from one strain
did not necessarily protect against others was common currency at Onderstepoort.
115 The
scientists believed that different strains of Bacillus anthracis might vary considerably in
their cross immunizing properties.
116 In this regard, an incident that occurred at Boshoff in
the Orange Free State during 1917 was much discussed. Observers described this outbreak,
which apparentlyaffected horses only, asunusually severe. Vets used bothlocal vaccine of
different batches and vaccine from the Pasteur Institute to immunize horses in the area, but
the outbreak continued unabated.
117 This suggested that there were strains of Bacillus
anthracis in South Africa against which the current vaccines were ineffective. A truly
efficient vaccine would need to incorporate these local types. As was the case in the United
States duringthe 1920s,scientistsatOnderstepoortbegan tocollectandisolate fromnature
different strains for possible use in a vaccine.
118
They also continued to evaluate foreign developments in vaccine technology. Imported
vaccine, including the Australian McGarvie-Smith vaccine and the American ‘‘Sobern-
heim’’ system, which used a combination of vaccine and immune serum, were tested and
found unsatisfactory under South African conditions.
119 In 1931, the Instituto Sieroter-
apico Milanese in Italy began issuing a vaccine under the trade-name ‘‘Carbazoo’’, which
contained ‘‘saponin’’, a vegetable glycoside used in the manufacture of soap. This alleg-
edly enabled the use of extremely virulent strains with high immunizing power, which
112Viloen,etal.,op.cit.,note30above,pp.486–7.
113Kehoe, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 234.
114Viljoen, et al., op. cit., note 30 above,
pp. 478–9.
115For a discussion of Theiler’s work in this
regard, see Gilfoyle, op. cit., note 25 above.
116J G Bekker, ‘The relation of the virulence of
attenuated anthrax strains to their immunizing value’,
Annual report of the Director of Veterinary Services
and Animal Industry, 15
th report, volume I, October
1929, Pretoria, Government Printer, 1929, p. 183.
117Union of South Africa [U.G.5 –1918], Annual
report of the Department of Agriculture, 1916–17,
Pretoria, Government Printing and Stationery Office,
1918, p. 47.
118R M Swiderski, Anthrax: a history, Jefferson,
NC, and London, McFarland, 2004, p. 155; Kehoe,
op. cit., note 29 above, p. 252.
119AOVI, box 1, file 1/1/3, A Theiler to Secretary
ofForestryandAgriculture,11Nov.1922;box65,file
10/5/2, C Gray, Principal Veterinary Officer, to
Director of Veterinary Research, 13 April 1920; box
65, file 10/5/2, A Theiler to R Jones, Veterinary
Advisor, Siam, 18 March 1926.
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Daniel Gilfoylewould otherwise have been too dangerous for vaccination. The scientists isolated the strain
of Bacillus anthracis used in Carbazoo and evaluated the effect of saponin on local strains,
finding that the substance enhanced the production of immunity rather than reducing the
virulence of the organism. As a result, from 1936, Onderstepoort issued a saponin-based
vaccine.
120
If there was little opposition to free vaccination, the expansion of the practice during the
1920s and 1930s was nevertheless accompanied by complaints from both white and
African stockowners, to which the scientists responded by adjusting the strength of the
vaccine.
121Followingaspateofaccidentsin1926,theyreleasedasporevaccinebasedona
more attenuated strain, but thereafter the number of cases detected increased, suggesting a
lack of immunizing power. As a result, Onderstepoort released a stronger vaccine in 1930
only for the cycle to be repeated soon afterwards.
122 In 1933, Alexander M Diesel, the
Senior Veterinary Officer for Natal, reported ‘‘alarming mortality,’’ as well as other
symptoms such as severe inflammation and swelling at the site of inoculation, among
30,000 African-owned cattle injected with vaccine from a particular batch. Ondersterpoort
received similar complaints at this time from the Transvaal and other parts of the coun-
try.
123 These failures provided evidence of continuing difficulties in striking a balance
between safety and efficacy in spite of the various improvements in the technology. While
officials might argue that such accidents made up only a small percentage of the total
number of vaccinations, they were nevertheless enough ‘‘to perturb the makers of the
vaccine’’.
124
Theimprovementofthevaccine inthefaceofthesesetbackswasthetaskofMaxSterne,
an Onderstepoort-trained veterinary scientist and bacteriologist appointed in 1934 to
manage vaccine production.
125 Sterne, who shared the belief of his colleagues that the
safety of their product was essential for public approval and the ultimate success of
vaccination,initiatednewlines ofresearch.
126Hisapproachtoimmunization was radically
different from earlier methods, which all depended on reducing the virulence of Bacillus
anthracis. Instead, Sterne aimed at solving the problem of safety by completely removing
120M Sterne, E M Robinson and J Nicol, ‘The use
of saponin spore vaccine for inoculation against
anthrax in South Africa.’, OJVSAI, 1939, 12 (2):
279–304,p. 299. See also Swiderski,op. cit., note 118
above, p. 155.
121Sterne and Robinson, op. cit., note 79 above,
p. 11.
122Ibid., pp. 11, 16.
123AOVI, box 65, file 10/5/2, Senior Veterinary
Officer, Natal, to Director of Veterinary Services,
Pretoria, 11 Oct. 1933; R Clark, Government
Veterinary Officer, Ermelo, to Director of
Veterinary Services, Onderstepoort, 14 Oct. 1933;
SABE LBD 4863 Z1002/16 vol. 2, K Schulz,
Government Veterinary Officer, Kimberley, to
Director of Veterinary Services, Pretoria, 15 Jan.
1934; SABE BAO 5862 2/316 vol. 2, Native
Commissioner, Nongoma, to Native Commissioner,
Pietermaritzburg, 31 April 1934 and
2 July 1934.
124BAO 5826 2/316 vol. 2, Secretary for Forestry
and Agriculture to Secretary for Native Affairs, 10
April 1934.
125Max Sterne (1905–1997) was borne in Trieste
and, at the age of four, emigrated with his parents to
South Africa. He graduated from Onderstepoort
veterinary faculty with the degree of Bachelor of
Veterinary Science in 1928. Sterne joined the
Onderstepoort laboratory in 1934 to supervise the
production of anthrax vaccine. His work on variation
in Bacillus anthracis was successfully submitted for a
doctoral thesis and was published in full in the
Onderstepoort Journal. In 1951, he moved to Britain,
where he was employed by the Wellcome Research
Laboratories.RDBigalke,‘Thefourteeneditorsofthe
Journal of the South African Veterinary Medical
Association’, Journal of the South African Veterinary
Association, 2000, 71: 68–76.
126Sterne and Robinson, op. cit., note 79 above,
p. 11.
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945the virulence (capacity to cause disease) of the organism, while retaining its ability to
stimulate the production of immunity. Perhaps influenced by the conception of Bacillus
anthracisas an environmentalactor currently invogue atOnderstepoort, he was concerned
with the biology of the organism, its behaviour under different environmental conditions
and the significance of this for immunization.
Sterne described how bacteriologists in Europe and America had linked the virulence of
Bacillus anthracis to the ability of the organism to form a ‘‘capsule’’ or cell wall, which
enabled it to evade phagocytosis (destruction by certain white blood cells). Bacilli which
did not produce capsules were rapidly destroyed by the body’s non-specific immune
defences and were therefore thought to be avirulent (unable to produce disease). This
property of encapsulation was, however, variable. Earlier researchers had found that
encapsulation in anthrax cultures could be encouraged or discouraged by manipulating
the amount of carbon dioxide present in the atmosphere. The degree of encapsulation was
judged by the appearance of a culture to the naked eye. Virulent strains cultured in normal
air were unencapsulated and colonies grown on solid media appeared ‘‘rough’’ on the
surface and edges. The same strains grown in a higher concentration of carbon dioxide
(similar to that within the animal body) developed capsules. As the percentage of capsuled
organisms increased, the colony took on a smoother, ‘‘mucoid’’ appearance to the
naked eye.
127
Sterne thought that previous researchers had missed the potential significance of this
variation for immunization.
128 In the course of propagating a series of these smooth
variants in a high percentage of carbon dioxide, he noticed that some of the colonies
began to display rough, unencapsulated outgrowths. When these unencapsulated organ-
isms were cultured in ordinary air they remained rough, and when transferred back to
carbon dioxide they failed to revert to the smooth capsulated form. It seemed that these
‘‘dissociated’’ variants had permanently lost their ability to form capsules, even, perhaps,
in the carbon dioxide rich environment of the animal body. Sterne reasoned that as the
property of encapsulation was associated with virulence, it was likely that these stable
rough variants were avirulent. This apparently proved to be the case; they failed to produce
any symptoms when injected into highly susceptible guinea-pigs. It was therefore some-
times possible to render a virulent strain of Bacillus anthracis avirulent by culturing it
under controlled conditions in the laboratory.
129 Previous authorities on anthrax immu-
nization generally insisted that a degree of virulence in the constituent organisms was
necessary for a vaccine to produce immunity. Sterne was aware, however, of German
studies from the 1910s, which suggested that apparently avirulent forms of Bacillus
anthracis found in nature could sometimes produce immunity. Such proved to be the
case; guinea-pigs injected with the unencapsuled, avirulent ‘‘disassociants’’ of certain
strains were later able to resist very large doses of a highly virulent strain.
130
These results raised the possibility of a completely avirulent vaccine, which Sterne
hoped would solve the problem of safety. A major practical problem was that the initial
127M Sterne, ‘Variation in Bacillus anthracis’,
OJVSAI, 1937, 8: 271–350, p. 272. Sterne quoted a
numberofarticlespublishedinEuropeandAmericain
describing these phenomena.
128Ibid., p. 280.
129Ibid., p. 283.
130Ibid., pp. 286–8.
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Daniel Gilfoyleproduction of the smooth variants from the rough, virulent organisms obtained from nature
was a long, tedious and unreliable process, which made it difficult to evaluate the immu-
nizing properties of many strains. A method of producing encapsulated smooth growths
regularly was required. Sterne theorized that the characteristic roughness of strains
obtained from dead animals might be an adaptation to the ‘‘normal’’ atmosphere under
which they were cultured in the laboratory. The conditions under which Bacillus anthracis
usually multiplied, however, were those of the blood-stream of a living animal. It might be
that the roughness which characterized these cultures was a biological adaptation to the
‘‘hostile’’ physical environment in which they had been grown. Capsuled smooth cultures
might be obtained more easily under conditions which emulated the natural environment
for the propagation of the organism, the animal body.
131
Sterne knew from the literature that anthrax bacilli formed capsules when cultured in
blood serum, but fluid media were useless for studying the morphology of colonies and
‘‘picking’’ variants, as the organisms diffused and intermingled in the liquid.
132 Further
progress depended on a local technical innovation. Sterne’s colleague, the British bacter-
iologistJHMason,devisedatubecontainingasemi-solidmediumofhorseserumandagar
in which the concentration of carbon dioxide could be manipulated.
133 Using this inven-
tion, Sterne found he could easily grow encapsuled smooth variants which regularly threw
outgrowthsofrough unencapsuledbacilli.These unencapsulated dissociantsallturnedout
to be avirulent when injected into guinea-pigs and some seemed to give a good degree of
protection against the injection of virulent cultures.
134
The remainder of Sterne’s work on anthrax was a process of evaluating the immunizing
properties of different strains, working out the optimal doses of ‘‘avirulent’’
135 vaccine for
different species of domestic animals with varying degrees of susceptibility and devising a
means of mass-producing the vaccine.
136 He eventually chose an unencapsuled dissociant
of a strain designated 34F2, which had been isolated from a severe outbreak.
137 Production
of the vaccine was technically a simple matter. Bacilli were picked from the dissociant
colony, allowed to sporulate and then freeze-dried. When vaccine was required, the
manufacturers germinated the spores and propagated them in large quantities on solid
agar. These cultures were then allowed to sporulate in oxygen (to ensure the keeping
property of the vaccine) and washed off into saline at a standard concentration for division
into metred individual doses. The avirulent nature of the new vaccine was significant for
qualitycontrol.Asitnowimmunized,ratherthankilledguinea-pigs,theycouldbeusedfor
131Ibid., p. 310; J H Mason, ‘A new culture tube’,
JSAVMA, 1933, 4: 89–90.
132For the importance of Robert Koch’s invention
ofsolidmediatothestudyofbacterialmorphologyand
colonies, see Mazumdar, Species and specificity,
op. cit., note 15 above, p. 76.
133Mason, op. cit., note 131 above, pp. 89–90.
134Sterne, op. cit., note 127 above, pp. 309–36.
135According to present knowledge, the virulence
of Bacillus anthracis depends on its ability to produce
toxin and capsules, which are independent genetic
characteristics, designated PXO1 (toxin) and PX02
(capsule).Sterne’s‘‘avirulent’’strainlackedthePX02,
butretainedPX01,sowasthereforenottrulyavirulent.
Stern acknowledged that the vaccine could produce
inflammationinhorsesandgoatsandissuedaseparate
vaccine for them. Swiderski, op. cit., note 118 above,
p. 161.
136M Sterne, ‘The effects of different carbon
dioxide concentrations of the growth of virulent
anthrax strains. Pathogenicity and immunity tests on
guinea-pigs and sheep with anthrax variants derived
from virulent strains’, OJVSAI, 1937, 9: 66.
137M Sterne, ‘The use of anthrax vaccines
prepared from avirulent (uncapsulated) variants
of Bacillus anthracis’, OJVSAI, 1939, 13: 307–12,
p. 307.
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945testing the degree of immunity produced by the vaccine. Furthermore, the results obtained
with the guinea-pigprovedpredictive forlarge animals, so there was no longer the need for
expensive large-scale testing on sheep. Sterne believed that safety was not at issue so there
was no formal testing, although individual batches of vaccine were initially injected into a
small number of animals in the field to check that they produced no severe reactions.
Vaccine derived from strain 34F2 was used for all animals, but smaller doses were found
necessary for horses and goats.
138
The ‘‘avirulent’’ vaccine was first released for field trials in 1936 and used on a large
scale from 1938.
139 Initially, however, Sterne for two reasons advised a certain caution in
advancing the merits of his invention. First, he believed that the results obtained in
laboratory experiments were unreliable guides to the outcome of field vaccination,
where quite different environmental conditions pertained.
140 Second, he considered it
difficult to control field vaccination sufficiently, ‘‘to produce statistically sound evidence
of a vaccine’s efficacy in the field’’.
141An experimental system of sufficient ‘‘statistical
soundness’’ to prove the safety and efficacy of the vaccine, however, already existed in the
Transkei.
Large-scale compulsory vaccination in the Transkei, where vets and other officials had
closely monitored mortality in cattle since the late 1920s, provided a means of obtaining
the statistical data that Sterne desired for the evaluation of the vaccine. Furthermore,
because the enforcement of hygienic measures against anthrax in the Transkei had
been abandoned as impractical, the scientists took the effectiveness of the vaccine as
the sole variable indetermining the incidence ofthe disease.
142 As all cattlein the Transkei
were vaccinated annually, and the vets were confident that they could detect virtually all
new cases, the conditions were sufficiently controlled for the manipulation of vaccination
to have the status of ‘‘an extensive experiment’’.
143 In this regard, the inverse relation
between the degree of attenuation of the earlier vaccines and the annual incidence of cases
revealed by inspection had been very striking. The number of reported outbreaks fell from
433 in 1928 to 34 in 1932 (following the instigation of comprehensive vaccination), but
rose again to 143 by 1936 after the release of a more attenuated vaccine. Sterne took this as
conclusive evidence that the further attenuation of the strain of Bacillus anthracis in use
had resulted in an appreciable decline in the efficacy of the vaccine.
144
If mass vaccination in the Transkei demonstrated conclusively the contradiction
between safety and efficacy in the use of vaccines based on virulent strains, Sterne
and his colleagues now used the Transkei for what was, in effect, a large-scale clinical
trial of the ‘‘avirulent’’ vaccine. During 1938, Nicol used the new product to treat 271,500
head of cattle in the Transkei district of Butterworth. The vaccine produced no injuries and
138In practice six guinea-pigs were injected with
0.01cc and another six with 0.001cc of the spore
suspension (vaccine). A batch of vaccine was passed
onlyifalltheguinea-pigswhichhadreceived0.01ccof
vaccine survived an injection containing a standard
dose of a virulent strain of anthrax. Typically, only
some of the six which received 0.001cc survived the
test.Afieldtestwasalso carriedouton sheepusingan
injectionwhichcontainedfourtimestheconcentration
of spores used in the standard vaccine. This was to
ensure that the vaccine would not produce any
unforeseen reactions. M Sterne, ‘Avirulent anthrax
vaccines’, OJVSAI, 1946, 21: 41–3.
139Sterne, op. cit., note 127 above, p. 310.
140Sterne and Robinson, op. cit., note 79 above,
p. 16.
141Sterne, op. cit., note 127 above, p. 309.
142Sterne, et al., op. cit., note 1 above, p. 54.
143Ibid., p. 53.
144Ibid., p. 56.
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Daniel Gilfoylein the following year only five cases of anthrax were recorded in the district (calculated as
0.0018 per cent of the population), slightly better than the results obtained with spore and
saponin-spore vaccines in the surrounding districts. Thereafter, the new vaccine was used
throughout the Transkei. By 1941, the number of outbreaks of anthrax reported in the
Transkei had fallen from 433 in 1928 to a new low of 17. For the rest of South Africa
excluding Natal (where compulsory vaccination had been imposed on a large scale, if not
comprehensively), the corresponding figures were 500 and 262. The real number was
probablymuchgreater,asthevetsestimatedthattheywereprobablyabletodetectonlyone
in seven outbreaks outside the Transkei, in areas where they were unable to exercise a
similar degree of control through the operation of the East Coast fever regulations. The
argument that the Transkei was a reservoir of infection was reversed and the Transkeian
administration now required the vaccination of cattle entering the Territories from the rest
of South Africa.
145 The adjoining district of Mount Currie, populated by ‘‘progressive and
prosperous Europeans’’, was more heavily infected than the African-occupied Transkei.
146
The results recorded in the Transkei were sufficient to allay Sterne’s own concerns that
mass vaccination in the field might contradict the successful laboratory experiments of the
mid-1930s.Theyprovidedconvincingstatisticalevidencesupportingtheefficacyofvaccina-
tion.
147Duringtheearly1940s,theveterinarycontroversyabouttheefficacyofvaccination
against anthrax closed.The ‘‘experiment’’inthe Transkei powerfully supported arguments
in favour of compulsory annual immunization using ‘‘avirulent’’ vaccine. Anthrax was
apparently close to eradication in the Transkei, an area in which state vets and officials had
historically found it very difficult to control animal diseases. On the other hand, hygienic
measures combined with voluntary vaccination seemed to have been less effective on
farms owned by whites. There was also closure of the scientific debate about the safety of
vaccination. Once Sterne’s ‘‘avirulent’’ vaccine had been adjusted for species of differing
susceptibility, it was regarded as harmless. In future, Onderstepoort scientists blamed
accidents with vaccination exclusively on operator error or other extraneous factors.
During the mid-1940s, now that veterinary policy makers had sufficient confidence in
Sterne’s invention, the state extended compulsory block vaccination to white farms in the
Mafeking district of the Northern Cape and the Witwatersrand, as well as many other Trans-
vaal districts.
148 In 1947, the senior government vet, Alexander Diesel, considered the fact
that officials in South Africa were still unable to guarantee that exported animal hides were
uncontaminated. While continuing to stress the need for hygienic measures, Diesel wrote
that, ‘‘For some months now, this Division has been arranging block inoculation of all
cattle in the more severe anthrax areas of the Union. This method of control will be
extended as far as possible as it is felt to be the only solution in the control of anthrax.’’
149
145SABE BAO 5826 2/316 vol. 2, Secretary for
Forestry and Agriculture to Secretary for Native
Affairs, 3 Oct. 1933.
146Sterne, et al., op cit., note 1 above, p. 61.
147Sterne and Robinson, op. cit., note 79 above, p.
16; M Sterne, ‘The use of anthrax vaccines prepared
from avirulent (unencapsulated) variants of bacillus
anthracis’, OJVSAI, 1939, 13 (2): 309.
148UnionofSouthAfrica,GovernmentNoticeNo.
2699–20 Dec. 1946. The complete list was Benoni,
Bethal, Boksburg, Brakpan, Bronkhorstspruit,
Germiston, Groblersdal, Johannesburg, Krugersdorp,
Lydenburg, Marico, Nigel, Pietersburg, Potgietersrus,
Pretoria, Roodepoort, Rustenburg, Springs,
Standerton, Vereeniging, Witbank and Zoutpansberg.
149SABE LBD Z1023 vol. 2, A M Diesel, for
Director of Veterinary Services to Secretary for
Agriculture and Forestry, 28 Oct. 1947.
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Anthrax in South Africa, c. 1910–1945Sterne’s invention, the ‘‘avirulent’’ spore vaccine based on the unencapsuled strain
34F2, spread throughout the world during the 1940s and replaced other forms of vaccina-
tion. It remains the standard method of animal vaccination against anthrax to the present
and provided the basis for subsequent research into a human vaccine.
150 The vaccine
contributed to the rising reputation of the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute in the inter-
national technoscientific network and followed the publication of a number of important
research findings on vaccines, toxicology and animal nutrition. The cattle owners of the
Transkei, placed under the veterinary regime entailed by the East Coast fever regulations,
unknowingly provided the testing ground for a vaccine technology which subsequently
achieved worldwide currency.
Conclusion
State veterinary medicine in South Africa has been described in the historiography as a
means of fostering commercial production by white South African pastoralists, but during
the 1920s and 1930s, Africans were the major recipients of anthrax vaccine. During the
firsttwentyyearsofthetwentiethcentury,veterinaryofficialsinSouthAfricabelievedthat
anthrax infection was becoming increasingly widespread and serious throughout much of
the country. By the early 1920s, the perceived prevalence of anthrax in South Africa meant
that the country faced the possibility of sanctions against some of its pastoral products. In
order to overcome this threat, the South African government instigated an increasingly
intensive campaign to control and reduce the incidence of the disease in the country. While
government vets stressed the need for hygienic measures based on the efficient reporting
anddetectionofindividualoutbreaks,theybelievedthatalackofresources,combinedwith
public unwillingness to co-operate, doomed these measures to failure. They identified the
incidence of anthrax among African-owned stock as presenting particular problems for a
policy based solely on notification and hygiene. Vaccination therefore became a key
element of the state’s disease control strategy.
From the 1920s, the South African state both encouraged and enforced vaccination
against anthrax on a large scale. During the 1920s and 1930s, however, the vets encoun-
tered considerable technical problems with vaccination, which led to a programme of
research at the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute. In spite of these difficulties and in the
context of a segregated society, the vets commenced the mass compulsory vaccination of
cattleinvariousAfricanreservesandlocationstowardstheendofthe1920s,particularlyin
the Transkei. Veterinary policy makers believed that the existing disease reporting reg-
ulations gave them an accurate picture of the incidence of anthrax there and used the
statistics to judge the efficacy and safety of different types of vaccine. Later, the compul-
sory immunization of cattle in the Transkei functioned as an extensive clinical trial for
Sterne’s ‘‘avirulent’’ vaccine. In this regard, the vaccination of African-owned cattle
underpinned the use of new vaccine technology across South Africa and eventually in
other parts of the world. It thus contributed to the increasing prestige of the Onderstepoort
Veterinary Institute in the international technoscientific network.
150Swiderski, op. cit., note 118 above, pp. 156–8.
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